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The drive toward outsourcing public services is bypassing
democratic oversight
The Coalition Government has fully and enthusiastically embraced the practice of ‘outsourcing’ through the
Open Public Services agenda. But what are the democratic implications? Daniel Silver of the Social Action &
Research Foundation argues that, despite protestations to the contrary, the evidence shows that outsourcing
allows accountability to effectively bypass democratic control, often leaving service users powerless and
voiceless.
Opening up the public
sector to competit ion
is nothing new,
although the coalit ion
government has
intensif ied and
expanded this
approach to
delivering public
services through their
Open Public Services
agenda.
A broader range of
organisations
delivering public
services does not in
itself  mean that
democratic
accountability is not
possible – but in its
current f ormat, it
appears to be weakened. Proponents of  more ‘choice and competit ion’ argue that it provides suf f icient
mechanisms f or democratic control: the public are able to choose which providers they receive services
f rom, and so the invisible hand of  the market will ensure that only the best organisations survive – meaning
that it is people’s choices that control the shape of  public services. Health expert Julian Le Grand argues
that this is f undamentally more democratic as ‘f unding f ollows choices’. Instead of  a f aceless bureaucrat
being able to dictate which services are delivered, it is the cit izen. This is meant to provide service-users
with a real measure of  economic power, which they are usually denied, empowering people through granting
them the disciplinary f orce of  exit ing a relationship with a particular public service provider.
The think-tank Policy Exchange declares that people “want more choice of  providers coming in to deliver
public services, and that this desire is especially strong among poorer and more vulnerable groups.” This
shows how the 2009 Social Attitudes Survey revealed that “more than eight out of  ten people believe that
parents should have ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of  choice about which state secondary school their child
attends.” Of  course people should have some f orm of  choice, but the pressing questions that remain
unaddressed are: who gets the choice, and what measures are in place to make this more equitable?
The democratic implications of  opening up public services need more thorough interrogation if  we are to
have a model of  choice that is democratic. Existing research simply does not provide a suf f iciently robust
evidence base f rom which to f undamentally transf orm public service delivery. It is largely based upon
questions of  either do you want choice, or state monopolies, without detail to consider the dif f erential
access that will emerge. For instance, the CBI and ACEVO asked whether people pref er ‘dif f erent providers
delivering services rather than monopoly government provision.’ Advocates of  choice and competit ion of ten
attack the producer interests of  the public sector that resist change. However organisations such as the
CBI and ACEVO represent the new producer interests, namely private industry and national voluntary sector
organisations.
If  there is evidence that the current model of  choice in public services increases democratic control f or all
cit izens, it would be good to see it. However questions remain unanswered and existing arguments could
be characterised as what Tom Slater has termed ‘decision-based evidence making.’
Many services are not f ungible goods – people of ten do not ‘choose’ to consume public services – many
people want to go to their local hospital, or send their children to the local school and want these to be as
ef f ective as they can be. Public services are f undamentally dif f erent to an economic market in that demand
is something that requires management, not stimulation. A certain level of  need will always exist f or public
services. Conceiving of  a model in terms of  supply and demand misses the point. The existing mechanisms
that have been designed to create responsiveness to the public are based on market principles and
theref ore susceptible to the inequalit ies inherent within such a system.
As a result of  the market-based approach that dominates our governance, cit izens have become
consumers. This is result ing in increasingly privatised and unequal participation due to the tendency of
more powerf ul consumer-cit izens to represent their demands in a more ef f ective way. For instance, if
middle classes abandon certain state schools, the quality of  provision f or those that rely on them may be
reduced, which would mean that services which exist f or people that live in poverty will be correspondingly
poor; to mitigate against this, an inequitable level of  inf luence may be conceded to middle class parents.
Neglecting social inequalit ies as a non-concern does not mean they magically disappear.
Ability to choose is of ten derived f rom the relation of  people to the market economy and so theref ore, the
more privileged members of  society of ten have more power within the system. As Coote and Franklin point
out, ‘choices and atomised transactions are constrained and edited by social, economic and environmental
f actors that f avour the better of f .’ The Centre f or the Analysis of  Social Exclusion have investigated
empirical inequalit ies in autonomy to show that f or the choice agenda to be more equitable, major structural
inequalit ies must be addressed – not only because of  their immediate ef f ects on quality of  lif e, but also
because of  the signif icant restrictions they impose on the autonomy of  those who are already
disadvantaged.
American crit ical theorist Nancy Fraser argues that designing a public space in which inequalit ies are
‘bracketed and neutralized’ is not a suf f icient condition to realise democracy. Yet this is exactly what the
current conf iguration of  the Open Public Services agenda appears to be doing within the context of  a highly
unequal society. There is a unique role f or the democratic state to mediate people’s access to public
services in a way that ensures more equitable outcomes. However, the wholesale out-sourcing of  public
services strips away the tradit ional structures that existed bef ore and have not suf f iciently replaced them.
Instead we have contractual arrangements over which the public have no control and which have litt le
connection to local democratic institutions.
This is clearly evident in the Work Programme. Central government-commissioned providers are delivering
local public services, although are accountable exclusively through contract to national government. This
means that they escape any f orm of  local democratic control and potential sanctions. Indeed, Work
Programme Prime Contractors have no obligation to explain their actions to local democratic structures
such as overview and scrutiny committees. Furthermore, corporations that are delivering services locally are
prohibited f rom sharing data with local authorit ies by primary legislation and concerns of  ‘commercial
sensit ivity.’
Accountability ef f ectively bypasses democratic control, delivered instead through contractual arrangements
based on a model of  Payment by Results (PBR). There is f ar f rom enough space in this article to begin to
start with analysis of  PBR, crit icism of  which has been likened to saying that kittens are evil. However much
is revealed by the declaration of  a Work Programme executive, who revealed that:
‘It ’s not about supporting 100 customers. It ’s about getting 50 of  them into a job. The other 50 are
collateral damage. At the end of  the day, they [ministers] don’t care about that other 50. It ’s an outcome
contract, not a service contract.’
This statement raises two important questions:
• What choice exists f or those f if ty people who are deemed ‘collateral damage’?
• What powers exist f or local democratic institutions to be able to represent its residents in order to
challenge such a process?
Such issues need addressing bef ore we ef f ectively out-source democratic control over our public services
to the vagrancies of  the market and bypass local institutions and cit izens f orever.
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